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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
ROGER EUGENE PENMAN, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ! 
) Case No. 960639-CA 
• Priority No. 3 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for manslaughter, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 
(1995), and robbery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1995) . This Court has jurisdiction over 
the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly deny defendant's motion 
to withdraw his pleas because defendant understood the nature and 
elements of the offenses to which he pleaded? 
This Court "review[s] a trial court's denial of a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard. 
The trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction with its 
decision will not be set aside unless they are clearly 
erroneous." State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993) 
(citations omitted). State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 
1994)("[W]hen a trial court has failed to make findings of fact 
on the record, [the reviewing court] will 'assume that the [trial 
court found facts] in accord with its decision7 whenever it would 
be 'reasonable to assume that the court actually made such 
findings.'")(quoting State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787-88 & n.6 
(Utah 1991)) . 
2. Was defendant afforded effective assistance of counsel 
such that his pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered? 
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims present a mixed 
question of law and fact. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521, 
525 (Utah 1994) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
698 (1984) and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)); accord 
State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1238 (Utah App. 1995). A 
reviewing court will defer to the trial court's factual findings 
and will review the trial court's application of the law to the 
findings for correctness. Id. (citing State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 
4-5 (Utah 1993)) . 
3. Did the defendant waive his rights to a speedy 
disposition of the charges under the Interstate Agreement on 
2 
Detainers Act? 
u[W]ithdrawal of a guilty plea is a privilege, not a right, 
that is left to the trial court's sound discretion." State v. 
Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah App. 1994) (citations 
omitted). Therefore, an appellate court "will not disturb a 
trial court's determination that the defendant has failed to show 
good cause or its ultimate denial of the motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea 'unless it clearly appears that the trial court 
abused its discretion.'" Id. (quoting State v. Trujillo-Martinez, 
814 P.2d 596, 599 (Utah App. 1991)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following provisions are relevant to the issues in this 
case and are set out in Addendum A: 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (1995) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with murder in the second degree, 
aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary, all first degree 
felonies, and two counts of theft, both second degree felonies 
(Criminal Trial, Dist. Ct. No. Cr-88-1015, "Crim. Tr." at 8-9). 
He subsequently pleaded no contest to manslaughter an: guilty to 
robbery (Crim. Tr. 265-74), and was sentenced to serve two one-
3 
to-fifteen year terms, to run concurrently, at the Utah State 
Prison (Crim. Tr. 93-94). Defendant later moved to withdraw his 
pleas (Crim. Tr. at 149-210). This is a direct appeal from the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion.1 
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS 
On or about November 1, 1987 at his home in Midvale, Utah, 
Spencer Nielson was robbed and then shot and killed (Crim. Tr. 9-
10, 200). Shortly thereafter, defendant and Monte "Bo" Johnston 
were arrested following a high-speed chase with authorities in 
Wyoming (Crim. Tr. 201). Oriental artifacts, identical to those 
taken from Nielson's home, were discovered in defendant's vehicle 
(Crim. Tr. 201). Several 20-gauge shotgun shells were also 
recovered from defendant's pockets (Crim. Tr. 201). These shells 
were subsequently sent to the FBI Laboratory for analysis (Habeas 
Corpus Proceedings, Dist. Ct. No. 9409033286, R. 240-41). 
Pursuant to an immunity agreement, Johnston agreed to speak 
to officers from the Salt Lake Sheriff's Office (Crim. Tr. 201). 
Johnston explained that he had accompanied defendant, Wendall 
1
 Although defendant has captioned this case as an appeal 
from both a direct appeal and an appeal from the denial of a 
petition for writ of habeus corpus, as the facts set forth below 
and the discussion immediately following show, it is properly 
only a direct appeal from Judge Rokich's order denying 
defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas, dated August 14, 1992. 
4 
Devon Baer, and Rick Lewis a.k.a. Kevin Baer to the Nielson 
residence on Halloween night (Crim. Tr. 202-03). That night, 
defendant was armed with a 20-gauge sawed-off shotgun (Crim. Tr. 
202). After stealing numerous oriental artifacts and other 
property, Johnston and defendant re-entered the residence and 
defendant shot Nielson with the 20-gauge shotgun (Crim. Tr. 202). 
A later polygraph revealed truthfulness on Johnston's part (Crim. 
Tr. 202). 
Defendant and Rick Lewis were subsequently arrested, and 
Lewis agreed to cooperate in exchange for a reduction in charges 
(Crim. Tr. 2 03). In a sworn statement, Lewis corroborated the 
details given by Johnston but could not state with certainty who 
shot the victim (Crim Tr. 203). A polygraph also revealed 
truthfulness on Lewis's part (Crim. Tr. 203). 
In January 1988, defendant was charged with murder in the 
second degree, aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary, all 
first degree felonies, and two counts of theft, both second 
degree felonies (Crim. Tr. at 8-9). Defendant was incarcerated 
in Nevada at the time charges were filed and he apparently filed 
for a 180-day disposition under the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers Act ("IAD"), Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (1995) (Crim. Tr. 
4; R. 7). Defendant later waived his rights under the IAD, on 
5 
the advice of counsel, in order to prepare his defense and 
conduct further investigations (Crim. Tr. 3-4; R. 14-15). 
Shortly before defendant's preliminary hearing and after 
being served with a subpoena, Johnston absconded (Crim. Tr. 2 03). 
During the preliminary hearing, defendant's counsel stipulated 
that Johnston had been subpoenaed (Crim. Tr. at 4). 
On October 28, 1988, defendant knowingly and voluntarily 
entered a no contest plea to manslaughter and a guilty plea to 
robbery (Crim. Tr. 265-74). He was sentenced to serve two one-
to-fifteen year terms, to run concurrently, at the Utah State 
Prison (Crim. Tr. 93-94) . 
After a series of delays in having new counsel appointed, 
defendant filed a motion to withdraw his pleas in March 1992 on 
the ground that his pleas were unknowing and involuntary, in part 
due to his former counsel's ineffective assistance (Crim. Tr. at 
149-210). On August 14, 1992 the trial court denied defendant's 
motion (Crim. Tr. at 242-43). Instead of appealing the court's 
denial of his motion, nineteen months later, in March 1994, 
defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeus corpus, claiming 
again that his pleas were unknowing and involuntary, and, for the 
first time, that his rights to a preliminary hearing and to a 
timely trial under the IAD had been violated. Defendant also 
6 
augmented his challenge to his pleas, claiming for the first time 
that his trial counsel had failed to obtain exculpatory results 
of FBI ballistics tests (R. 2-110). In response, the State filed 
a motion for summary judgment, arguing that defendant was 
procedurally barred from raising claims in a post-conviction 
proceeding that he could have raised on direct appeal (R. 160-
215). Following argument, Judge Bohling granted the State's 
motion on the ground that defendant's claims were procedurally 
barred and because he was unpersuaded that defendant did not 
knowingly and voluntarily enter his pleas (R. 264; 280-85). 
Defendant then filed a notice of appeal from the dismissal 
of his petition (R. 287). The Utah Court of Appeals reversed 
Judge Bohling's summary judgment dismissal of defendant's 
petition for a writ of habeus corpus without addressing the 
ruling that the pleas were given knowingly and voluntarily, 
stating, 
n x
 [o]nee a trial court on habeas review determines that 
a defendant has been denied the constitutional right to 
appeal, a direct appeal should be provided immediately, 
without adjudication of any other claims, such as 
ineffective assistance of counsel.'" 
(R. 338-39)(quoting State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 357 (Utah App. 
1996))(emphasis in original)(quoting State v. Hallett. 856 P.2d 
1060, 1062 (Utah 1993)). Therefore, this Court remanded the case 
7 
for reentry of the order denying defendant's motion to withdraw 
his pleas in order to allow defendant to have a first appeal of 
right from that order (R. 338-39). In accordance with this 
Court's order, Judge Bohling reentered the trial court's order of 
August 14, 1992 tunc pro nunc (Crim Tr. 258; R. 341). Defendant 
then filed a notice of appeal in September 1996, making this his 
first appeal of right (R. 348) .2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant's pleas to manslaughter and robbery were knowingly 
and voluntarily entered. Defendant executed affidavits clearly 
2
 Notwithstanding the express directive of this Court 
limiting defendant to an appeal of the trial court's denial of 
his motion to withdraw his no contest and guilty pleas, defendant 
filed a notice of appeal not only challenging the trial court's 
denial of his motion to withdraw his pleas (Case No. CR-88-1051), 
but also challenging Judge Bohling's dismissal of his habeas 
petition (Case No. 940903286HC), thereby unilaterally providing 
himself with a second attack at the substantive rulings in the 
dismissal of his petition (R. 358). If defendant was 
dissatisfied with the limitations of this Court's decision, he 
should have petitioned this Court for rehearing or petitioned the 
Utah Supreme Court for writ of certiorari. Alteratively, 
defendant should have moved in the trial court, on the basis of 
additional grounds, for reconsideration of its denial of his 
motion. In declining these appropriate alternative routes, 
defendant has improperly attempted to supplement his original 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas with claims newly raised in 
his habeas petition, an outcome plainly beyond this Court's 
contemplation in limiting his appeal to the denial of his 
original motion. 
8 
and unambiguously setting out the elements of the offenses and 
the facts of the crimes in terms of those elements . At the plea 
hearing the trial court discussed with defendant his affidavit, 
restated the facts of the offense as they applied to the elements 
of the offenses, and elicited from defendant his understanding of 
the affidavit and that he was surrendering constitutional rights 
by pleading. 
POINT II 
Defendant's claims are waived by virtue of his voluntarily 
entering pleas. Even upon consideration, defendant's claims, 
that his counsel and the prosecutor withheld from him 
"exculpatory" information concerning witnesses and tests 
conducted on physical evidence are based primarily on conjecture, 
are without evidentiary support, and do not justify a belief that 
defendant would otherwise have withdrawn his pleas. 
POINT III 
Defendant's claim challenging the trial court's 
jurisdiction, based on the Interstate Agreement on Detainers and 
an alleged defect in his preliminary hearing, is not properly 
before the Court because it was not embraced by the trial court's 
denial of his motion to withdraw his pleas, the only basis for 
this appeal. Additionally, defendant waived the claim when he 
9 
voluntarily entered his pleas. In any case, defendant 
voluntarily waived the period in which he was required to be 
brought to trial, and any impropriety in the prosecutor's failing 
to clarify the nature of a witness's possible immunity agreement 
was not prejudicial considering the evidence in support of 
defendant's bindover. 
ARGUMENT 
PQINT I 
DEFENDANT'S PLEAS TO MANSLAUGHTER AND ROBBERY WERE 
KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED. 
Defendant argues that his guilty plea and his no contest 
plea did not strictly comply with the requirements of rule 11(e), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and State v. Gibbons, 74 0 P.2d 
1309 (Utah 1987), because he did not understand the nature and 
elements of the offenses to which he pleaded. Appellant's Br. at 
16. However, the record indicates defendant had a clear 
understanding of the nature and elements of both manslaughter and 
robbery. 
A. Defendant's Pleas were made in Strict Compliance with 
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Rule 11(e) (4) provides: "The court may refuse to accept a 
plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may 
not accept the plea until the court has found . . . the defendant 
10 
understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the 
plea is entered. . . . " Strict compliance with rule 11 is 
required. State v. Hoff. 814 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1991). A 
trial court must "personally establish that the defendant's 
guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the 
record that the defendant knowingly waived his or her 
constitutional rights and understood the elements of the crime." 
State v. Abeyta. 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993) (per curiam). In 
addition, the trial court must determine that the defendant 
"'possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the 
facts.'" State v. Breckenridae. 688 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1983) 
(quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969)). 
However, the trial court is not "rigidly tied to the 
colloquy with the defendant [or] relegated to rote recitation of 
the rule 11 elements when entertaining a plea." Abeyta, 852 P.2d 
at 996 (citing State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216, 218 n.2 (Utah 
1991) (per curiam)). The rule can be satisfied by multiple 
means. See Maguire. 830 P.2d at 218. The record on appeal 
includes the contents of documents that have been properly 
incorporated and those which are clearly part of the defendant's 
knowledge and understanding. Id. at n.2. In determining whether 
a defendant understands the factual elements of the crime 
11 
charged, it is proper to look at a "transcript of the oral 
colloquy between the court and defendant, contents of a written 
affidavit that the record reflects was read, understood, and 
acknowledged by defendant and the court, contents of other 
documents such as the information, presentence report, exhibits, 
etc., similarly incorporated into the record, and so on." Id. at 
218.3 
The record demonstrates that defendant understood the 
factual elements of the crimes charged. First, defendant is 
charged with knowledge of the information based on his knowing 
and intelligent waiver of its reading, both in the circuit and 
district courts at time of arraignment, a matter unchallenged on 
appeal (Crim. Tr. 4, 76). Further, defendant stated in the 
affidavits he executed for each offense to which he plead that "I 
have received a copy of the charge (Information) and understand 
the crime . . . (R. 79, 84). The information provided defendant 
3
 See also State v. Thurman. 911 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah 1996) 
(looking at defendant's plea affidavit and the plea colloquy 
between defendant and the trial judge); Hoff, 814 P.2d at 1125 
(looking at the information and probable cause statement); 
Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989) (examining 
testimony at preliminary hearing and reading of charges at 
arraignment, as well as defendant's level of intelligence, 
education, and understanding of the English language, in finding 
pleas knowing and voluntary). 
12 
with notice that he was charged with, among other things, 
criminal homicide/murder in the second degree and aggravated 
robbery, both first degree felonies, and set out the elements of 
each crime (Crim. Tr. 8). The information also contained a 
detailed probable cause statement describing the factual basis of 
the charge, including the fact that defendant had shot Nielson at 
close range with a 20-gauge sawed-off shotgun during the course 
of a burglary or robbery (Crim. Tr. 10). Defendant was also 
present at the preliminary hearing to hear the State's evidence 
against him, including the testimony of co-defendant Rick Lewis 
(See Crim. Tr. 4); cf. Jolivet, 784 P.2d at 1150 (finding it 
significant that defendant attended the preliminary hearing at 
which the victim testified in detail about the alleged crimes). 
At the plea proceeding, defendant also signed affidavits 
which set out the elements of manslaughter and robbery and the 
facts supporting those elements (Crim. Tr. 79-88, attached at 
Addendum B) .4 Each affidavit stated: UI have read this 
4
 The affidavit for manslaughter set out the following 
elements and supporting facts: 
Elements: That the defendant as a party to the offense 
recklessly caused the death of another. 
Facts: On October 31, 1987, at 111 South Allen Street, 
Midvale, Utah; the defendant was a party to a robbery during 
which, the victim of that robbery, Spencer Nielsen, was 
killed. 
13 
Affidavit, or I have had it read to me by my attorney and I know 
and understand its contents." (Crim. Tr. 81, 86).5 Also 
significant was the fact that defendant had his G.E.D., had 
attended one year of college, and could read and understand 
English (Crim. Tr. 81, 86); cf. Jolivet. 784 P.2d at 1150 
(emphasizing defendant was of "above-average intelligence," had 
completed two years of college, and understood the English 
language). The affidavits executed by defendant in open court 
thus stated facts showing that he was informed of and understood 
the elements of manslaughter and robbery. 
Finally, the plea colloquy shows that defendant understood 
the nature of the elements of both crimes (Crim Tr. 266-74, 
(Crim. Tr. 79). 
The affidavit for robbery set out the following elements and 
supporting facts: 
Elements: That the defendant as a party to the offense 
unlawfully and intentionally took the property of another 
from his immediate presence against his will and 
accomplished this by means of force or fear. 
Facts: On October 31, 1987, at 111 South Allen Street, 
Midvale, Utah; the defendant took property from the 
immediate presence of Spencer Nielsen by means of force or 
fear. 
(Crim. Tr. 84). 
5
 Both affidavits were also certified by defendant's 
attorneys, certifying defendant had read the affidavit or had it 
read to him and that his attorneys believed defendant fully 
understood the meaning of its contents (Crim. Tr. 82, 87). 
14 
attached at Addendum C). The trial court began by stating the 
elements of manslaughter and the facts supporting that charge 
(Crim Tr. 270). After confirming these with counsel, the court 
asked defendant: "So then, as set out in this affidavit, are the 
facts true and correct to the best of your knowledge?" (Crim. Tr. 
271). Defendant replied, "Yes, your Honor," and entered a no 
contest plea (Crim. Tr. 271, 273-74). The court then moved on to 
recite the elements of robbery and the facts supporting that 
charge (Crim. Tr. 271-72). The court specifically asked 
defendant: "Are those the facts, Mr. Penman?," to which defendant 
replied, "Yes, Sir" (Crim. Tr. 272). The court then stated, "And 
you understand the elements of both of those charges," and asked 
defendant for his plea to robbery (Crim. Tr. 272). Defendant 
said: "That would be guilty, your Honor" (Crim. Tr. 272). 
Lastly, the court asked defendant if he was entering a plea 
because he did, in fact, commit robbery (Crim. Tr. 272). 
Defendant said: "Yes. I was a party to the offense of robbery; 
yes, your Honor" (Crim. Tr. 272). Defendant then executed the 
affidavits in open court (Crim. Tr. 272). The record thus shows 
that the trial court strictly complied with rule ll.6 
6
 The record also demonstrates that the trial court 
inquired into defendant's competency, his knowledge of his 
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Defendant claims that State v. Abeyta required the trial 
court to engage him in a colloquy regarding the elements and that 
its failure to do so was "improper." Appellant's Br. at 18. 
However, defendant misreads Abeyta. In Abeyta, the supreme court 
never reached "the issue of whether the elements of the offense 
contained in the affidavit were sufficiently addressed" because 
the trial court had not reached the merits of Abeyta's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 852 P.2d at 996. 
Moreover, Utah law clearly demonstrates a trial court is not 
required to personally discuss each element with the defendant. 
Even if the trial judge makes no inquiry into the elements of the 
offense charged and their relationship to the facts, the record 
may still be sufficient to support the conclusion that the 
defendant understood the elements of the crime and how those 
elements related to the facts. See Hoff. 814 P.2d at 1125 
(citing State v. Jolivet. 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989)). For 
example, in State v. Trujillo-Martinez. 814 P.2d 596 (Utah App. 
1991), this Court held the trial court's failure to question 
defendant during the colloquy as to whether he understood the 
constitutional rights, his knowing waiver of those rights, 
sentencing possibilities, and defendant's satisfaction with the 
advice of his counsel (Crim. Tr. 268-69). 
1€ 
nature and elements of his charge was not an abuse of discretion 
since defendant's affidavit strictly complied with rule 11 and 
the colloquy established defendant voluntarily and knowingly 
signed the affidavit. Id. at 600. This Court has made it clear 
that the trial court is only required to clarify "any omissions 
or ambiguities" in defendant's affidavit as well as "any 
uncertainties raised in the course of the plea colloquy." State 
v. Smith. 812 P.2d 470, 477 (Utah App. 1991). The court "need 
not repeat, verbatim, Rule 11 inquiries that are clearly posed 
and answered in the affidavit, unless Rule 11 by its terms 
specifically requires such repetition." Id.; see also Maguire, 
830 P.2d at 218 n.2 (refusing to require that all of the elements 
of rule 11(5) be expressly addressed in the plea colloquy if they 
are specified in the affidavit); Truiillo-Martinez. 814 P.2d at 
599 (asserting the trial court need not perform a verbatim 
recitation of each and every statement made in defendant's 
affidavit). 
Since defendant did not express any confusion or even ask 
any questions regarding the elements or facts during the plea 
colloquy, and his plea affidavits were unambiguous and complete, 
the trial judge was not required to specifically discuss each 
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element with defendant.7 The trial court was certainly not 
obligated to inform defendant "that his pleas would result in his 
being treated as a murderer," as defendant suggests. Appellant's 
Br. at 10. 
POINT 11 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL WHEN HE VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY AGREED TO A 
PLEA BARGAIN 
Defendant claims his pleas were involuntary because he was 
denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel during the preparatory stages of his case and when he 
7
 Defendant claims the phrase "a party to the offense of 
robbery during the commission of which, the victim of that 
robbery . . . was killed" is ambiguous in that it did not convey 
to him "that he was admitting to the act of killing or to being 
an accessory to murder." Appellant's Br. at 17. However, the 
statement of the elements in defendant's affidavit for 
manslaughter made it sufficiently clear he was admitting to 
ncaus[ing] the death of another" as a party to the offense of 
robbery (Crim. Tr. 79). The plea is consistent with the 
information, in which defendant was charged not only with 
intentionally and knowingly murdering the victim, but also with 
"caus[ing] the death of Spencer Neilson," during the "commission 
. . . of aggravated robbery . . . , " both variants of first 
degree felony murder (Crim. Tr. 8). Defendant's no contest plea 
to manslaughter, a second degree felony, is plainly the result of 
the State's inability to prove that defendant was the actual 
murderer, acknowledged by the prosecutor at the plea hearing (R. 
266-67). 
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entered his pleas.8 Appellant's Br. at 20. Defendant 
specifically contends that his trial counsel performed 
ineffectively by (1) acting in collusion with the prosecutor by 
entering into a "fraudulent" stipulation that Johnston had been 
subpoenaed, and (2) failing to inform him and the court that Rick 
Lewis had committed perjury and was testifying pursuant to an 
immunity agreement, or in the alternative, tnat she failed to 
investigate and learn of these facts. Appellant's Br. at 20. 
Defendant also argues he would not have entered pleas to robbery 
and manslaughter if he was made aware of three pieces of 
8
 In connection with his claim of ineffective assistance, 
see Appellant's Br. at Poir.i II, defendant also asserts he was 
denied "the substantial right of preliminary examination into the 
charges." Appellant's Br. at 20. However, defendant cites no 
legal authority in support of this point at Point II, and only 
cursory reference to unsupportive authority at Point IV, 
challenging the trial court's brief. Because defendant makes no 
substantive legal argument on this point, this Court should 
refuse to address it. See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 
(Utah 1984) (declining to rule on arguments which defendant fails 
to support by any legal analysis or authority). Furthermore, 
since this appeal is only from the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas, a motion which did not 
challenge the propriety of the preliminary examination, this 
issue is not properly before this Court. See Penman v. Carver. 
No. 960639-CA (Utah App. April 25, 1996)(memorandum decision 
directing reentry of trial court order denying motion to withdraw 
pleas) (R. 338-40). Notwithstanding defendant's insur^icient 
briefing, the State has briefly addressed this claim in 
connection with defendant's challenge to the trial court's 
jurisdiction, see Appellant's Br. at Point IV, at Point III of 
this brief. 
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"exculpatory" information: (1) the results of an FBI ballistics 
report; (2) a sworn statement given to the State by Rick Lewis; 
and (3) information that Johnston had not been subpoenaed and 
that no arrest warrant had been issued for him. Appellant's Br. 
at 21-24. However, this Court need not reach all of defendant's 
claims because the record is inadequate to resolve them, and 
further, defendant has waived this argument. Defendant's claim 
also fails on the merits because defendant cannot meet either 
prong of the Hill v. Lockhart test. 
When ineffectiveness claims are raised for the first time on 
appeal, they will only be reviewed "if the trial record is 
adequate to permit decision of the issue and defendant is 
represented by counsel other than trial counsel." State v. 
Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991). " [P]roof of 
ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter 
but must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 
870, 877 (Utah 1993). In this case, defendant has failed to make 
part of the record a transcript of the preliminary hearing, 
necessary to determine whether defendant's counsel failed to 
cross—examine Lewis as to his agreement with the prosecutor or 
whether the prosecutor failed to disclose Lewis's agreement to 
the court, or any record evidence that either his counsel or the 
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prosecutor knew that Johnston had not been subpoenaed.9 
Defendant's claims that defense counsel knew of allegedly 
exculpatory evidence and did not convey that information to him 
are purely speculative and are not supported with demonstrable 
proof. This Court should therefore refuse to address defendant's 
ineffective assistance claim on appeal. 
Moreover, when defendant knowingly and voluntarily pleaded 
no contest to manslaughter and guilty to robbery, he waived all 
nonjurisdictional defects, including any Sixth Amendment 
violations. It is well-settled that a knowing and voluntary plea 
constitutes a waiver of "all nonjurisdictional defects, including 
pre-plea constitutional violations." See. e.g.. State v. 
9
 An appellate court will uas — the regularity of the 
proceedings below when appellant fa to provide an adequate 
record on appeal." State v. Blubaugh. 904 P.2d 6c. , 69S- lUtah 
App. 1995), cert, denied. 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996) (citing 
Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Utah 1989)). 
When a defendant predicates error to [an appellate court], 
he has the duty and responsibility of supporting such 
allegation by an adequate record. Absent that record, 
defendant's assignment of error stands as a unilateral 
allegation which the review court has no power to determine. 
This Court simply cannot rule on a question which depends 
for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the 
record. 
State v. Wulffenstein. 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982) (citations 
omitted). 
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Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989); State v. Sery. 758 P.2d 
935, 938 (Utah App. 1988). This Court should thus decline to 
address defendant's ineffectiveness claim because, in addition to 
providing an inadequate record, the defendant waived this 
argument below when he entered knowing and voluntary pleas. 
Even if this Court considers defendant's Sixth Amendment 
claim on the merits, his argument fails because he has not met 
either prong of the Hill v. Lockhart test. In determining 
whether counsel is constitutionally ineffective, Utah courts 
employ the two-part test established in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 
U.S. 52 (1985). See e.g., Parsons. 872 P.2d at 525. To prevail 
on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must show: (1) 
"that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some 
demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment"; and (2) "that 
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." Parsons v. 
Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994)(quoting Bundy v. Deland, 
763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988)(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687). Unless this Court finds that defendant was prejudiced by 
his trial counsel's performance, it "need not decide whether that 
performance was deficient." State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 43 9, 
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441 (Utah 1996) (citing Strickland. 466 U.S. at 697).10 
A. Defendant has not Shown he was Prejudiced bv his 
CQifflgel'fr Performance. 
"Where a defendant challenges a guilty plea on grounds of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, he or she must show xa 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he [or 
she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial."' Parsons. 871 P.2d at 525 (quoting Hill v. 
Lockhart. 474 U.S.at 59). "Legal representation that is 
'unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in 
another.'" Parsons, 871 P.2d at 522 (quoting Strickland. 466 
U.S. at 693). The prejudice component of the Strickland test 
therefore requires a defendant to establish a nexus between 
counsel's deficient performance and the reliability of the plea 
process in order to prevent potential windfalls to the defendant, 
see id.. and to "serve the fundamental interest in the finality 
of guilty pleas." Hill v. Lockhart. 474 U.S. at 58, 106 S. Ct. 
at 370. Defendant's claim "may not be speculative, but must be a 
10
 Prejudice is first addressed because it embraces both 
the State's responses to defendant's claim that his counsel 
performed ineffectively and that the prosecutor failed to turn 
over exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83 
(1963) . Indeed, as subsequently argued, defense counsel did 
perform effectively. 
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demonstrable reality." State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 
1986). "It is not enough to claim that the alleged errors had 
some conceivable effect on the outcome or could have had a 
prejudicial effect on the fact finders." Id. 
1. The State did not fail to disclose material 
exculpatory information. 
Prosecutors have an affirmative constitutional duty to 
disclose material evidence that would tend to exculpate the 
accused. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 96 S. Ct. 
2392, 2399 (1976); Brady. 373 U.S. at 104; State v. Carter. 707 
P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985). Disclosure is only mandatory when the 
evidence is (1) exculpatory and (2) material to the issue of 
guilt. 
There is no duty to disclose non-exculpatory information. 
See State v. Mickelson, 848 P.2d 677, 689 n.16 (Utah App. 1992). 
"Exculpatory" evidence is that which "tends to justify, excuse or 
clear the defendant from alleged fault or guilt." Black's Law 
Dictionary 566 (6th ed. 1991). "The materiality required to 
reverse a criminal conviction for suppression or destruction or 
evidence . . . is more than evidentiary materiality." State v. 
Nebeker. 657 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Utah 1983). The evidence must be 
material in the constitutional sense. Id. "Constitutional 
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materiality" requires 
there be a showing that the suppressed or destroyed 
evidence is vital to the issues of whether the defendant 
is guilty of the charge and whether there is a fundamental 
unfairness that requires the Court to set aside the 
defendant's conviction. . . . "The mere possibility 
that an item of undisclosed information might have 
helped the defense or might have affected the outcome 
of the trial does not establish 'materiality' in the 
constitutional sense." 
State v. Lovato. 702 P.2d 101, 106 (Utah 1985) (quoting Agurs. 
427 U.S. at 109-10). There is thus VMno constitutional 
requirement that the prosecutor make a complete and detailed 
accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a 
case,'" State v. Workman. 635 P.2d 49, 52 (Utah 1981) (quoting 
Moore v. Illinois. 408 U.S. 786, 92 S. Ct. 2562 (1972)), or that 
he or she "'disclose any and all information which may assist 
said defendant in preparing for trial.'" Id. (quoting State v. 
Horn. 610 P.2d 551 (Idaho 1980)). As the court said in State v. 
A fair-minded prosecutor is not likely to be aware 
of all potential evidence which a defendant may think 
relevant, and we do not think it reasonable, given the 
adversary nature of the criminal process, to require a 
prosecutor to disclose all evidence which might possibly 
be useful to the defense but which is not likely to have 
a foreseeable effect upon the verdict. Such a requirement 
would create unbearable burdens and also uncertainties 
with respect to the finality of judgments. 
608 P.2d 218, 225 (Utah 1980). 
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Defendant bears the burden of proving that the information 
sought was both exculpatory and material. See State v. Worthen. 
765 P.2d 839, 850 (Utah 1988) (rejecting defendant's claim that 
the prosecutor withheld exculpatory witness interviews, absent 
some evidence that the interviews had taken place and were 
exculpatory). If the prosecution does not disclose requested 
information to the defense, it is appropriate to conclude, absent 
some showing to the contrary, that the prosecution possessed no 
exculpatory records with regard to the request. Workman. 635 
P.2d at 52 n.22 (citation omitted). "To do otherwise would be to 
impugn the prosecution's conduct on no more than the strength of 
appellants' unsupported accusations--an act [this Court] 
certainly would chose to avoid." Id. 
a. Results of the Ballistics Tests 
As a preliminary matter, any claims regarding the results of 
the ballistics test are not properly before the Court in this 
appeal. As noted above, defendant's appeal is properly taken 
only from the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his 
pleas. Defendant's claims regarding the results of ballistics 
tests were not addressed in his motion to withdraw his pleas, but 
rather only in his petition for writ of habeas corpus (Crim Tr. 
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14 9-163; see [Defendant's Memorandum in] Opposition to 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 220, 225-26, 240-
41). Therefore, the Court should decline to consider these 
claims. 
Even considering defendant's claims, defendant has failed to 
meet his burden to show that the results of the ballistics tests 
were exculpatory or not turned over to defendant. The results 
could only be characterized as inconclusive or inculpatory. 
Following the robbery and homicide, Wyoming authorities recovered 
several 20-gauge shotgun shells from Johnston's truck and from 
defendant's pockets (R. 78). These shells were later sent to the 
FBI Laboratory for analysis, where they were compared with one 
shotshell wad and one hundred pellets recovered from the victim's 
body (R. 240). A 20-gauge Stevens sawed-off shotgun was also 
examined (R. 241). The results of the FBI's examination were: 
(1) The shotshell wad recovered from the victim was 
consistent in appearance with the type of wad commercially 
loaded by Fiocchi into shotshells like those recovered from 
the defendant's pockets and Johnston's vehicle. 
(2) The 100 pellets recovered from the victim are nickel-
plated lead pellets, consistent with No. 6 shot. The 
shotshells recovered from defendant and Johnston's vehicle 
were commercially loaded with nickel-plated No. 6 shot. 
(3) No conclusion could be reached as to whether the 
shotshells recovered from defendant's pockets and Johnston's 
vehicle were ever loaded into the 2 0-gauge shotgun. 
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(4) When a representative sample of the 100 pellets 
recovered from the victim was compared with a representative 
sample of the pellets from the shotshells recovered from 
defendant's pocket and Johnson's vehicle, "close 
compositional associations were found." These results 
suggested the pellets could have originated from shotshells 
found within the same box, or could have originated 
from different boxes of shotshells of the same type and 
manufacturer that were packaged on or about the same date. 
(See R. 241; attached at Addendum D). 
These results are clearly not exculpatory. On the contrary, 
they tended to incriminate the defendant. Therefore, the 
prosecution was under no duty to disclose them. See Workman. 635 
P.2d at 53 (holding prosecutor had no constitutional duty to 
disclose content of statements that were inculpatory or "not 
susceptible of an interpretation that would in any way give rise 
to a reasonable doubt of guilt"). Furthermore, evidence is 
generally "not improperly withheld if the defense has knowledge 
of that evidence and defense counsel simply fails to request it." 
Jarrell. 608 P.2d at 225 (citations omitted). Defense counsel 
was or should have been aware that the shotshells and rifle had 
been sent to the FBI for analysis because the State's response to 
defendant's discovery request included the letter accompanying 
the evidence to the lab (See "Evidence letter to the F.B.I, from 
Detective Jerry Thompson dated January 29, 1988," Crim. Tr. 33). 
It is thus appropriate to assume defendant, or at least his 
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attorney, knew such tests were being conducted. In any event, 
any alleged failure by the prosecutor to volunteer the FBI's 
report was not improper. 
Jb. The Sworn Statement Given by Rick Lewis 
Defendant asserts that the State failed to disclose 
documents which established that Rick Lewis had an immunity 
agreement with the State. Appellant's Br. at 22. Evidence 
impeaching the credibility of a key government witness falls 
under the Brady rule and must be disclosed to the defense. 
United States v. Baaley. 473 U.S. 667, 676-77 (1985); Giglio v. 
United States. 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). However, as the 
criminal record indicates, Lewis's statement was turned over to 
defendant on April 12, 1988 in response to his request for 
discovery (See Crim. Tr. 33, 40). 
c. Johnston's Subpoena 
Defendant claims to have proof that Johnston was not served 
a subpoena. Appellant's Br. at 7, 9, 22. However, defendant has 
no proof at all. The court minute entry responding to his 
request for a copy of Johnston's subpoena simply states: "The 
Court is unable to locate a subpoena issued for Monte Dean 
Johnston." (R. 106). This does not mean that Johnston was never 
served with a subpoena, but only that the Court has no record of 
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one. Based on the record it is probable that a subpoena was 
issued, but that the return was inadvertently not entered in the 
file, and that Johnston was served with a subpoena, but chose not 
to appear. 
Additionally, according to a letter from the prosecutor to 
the Board of Pardons, Johnston was in fact served with a subpoena 
before the preliminary hearing and prior to absconding (R. 80). 
Defense counsel also stipulated during the preliminary hearing 
that Johnston was subpoenaed and that if the authorities who 
served Johnston were called, they would testify that Johnston was 
served a subpoena to testify in the matter (Crim. Tr. 203). 
Finally, whether or not Johnston was subpoenaed is 
immaterial to the question of defendant's guilt. State v. 
Stewart, 544 P.2d 477, 479 (Utah 1975) (evidence that is not 
"vital" to the issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence need 
not be disclosed). In response to discovery requests (Crim. Tr. 
2 9-30), the prosecutor evidently turned over all statements made 
by Johnston to several investigators, including a polygraph 
examination of Johnston (Crim. Tr. 33, 35, 40). 
2. Defendant has failed to show he would have 
insisted on proceeding to trial if he was aware of 
this information. 
Defendant has not made the requisite showing of prejudice 
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and thus cannot prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. As discussed above, defendant's claims that exculpatory 
and material evidence was withheld from him are unsupported by 
the record. Defendant has further failed to provide the 
demonstrable proof that is required to support an ineffectiveness 
claim. See Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. Defendant has not provided 
this Court with any record evidence that defense counsel "acted 
in collusion with the prosecutor/' see Appellant's Br. at 20, and 
he has not shown that he was prejudiced in any way by counsel's 
actions or inaction. 
Specifically, defendant has failed to show that his counsel 
did not stipulate in good faith, based on the prosecutorss 
representation, that Johnston had been subpoenad. More 
particularly, he has failed to show that Johnston's absence "may 
deprived him of the opportunity to show that another and not the 
defendant committed the crime in question." Appellant's Br. at 
27. Indeed, the term "may" shows that defendant's claim is 
merely speculative. In fact, all evidence tends to show that 
Johnston's presence at the preliminary hearing would have been 
damaging, since only he claimed that defendant had actually shot 
the victim (Crim. Tr. 202). 
Defendant's claim that he would not have entered his pleas 
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if he had known that Lewis was testifying pursuant to a promise 
of immunity is not credible. On January 26, 1988, the prosecutor 
filed an affidavit in which he stated that Lewis would not be 
charged in exchange for his testimony (Crim. Tr. 17, 18). Also, 
as indicated above, in response to a discovery request the 
prosecutor turned over Lewis's recorded statement in which the 
immunity agreement, as then contemplated, was explicitly 
discussed (Crim. Tr. 33, 40). On April 21, defense counsel 
acknowledged her receipt of the discovery documents and Lewis's 
immunity, using it as a basis for requesting a continuance of the 
preliminary hearing in order to prepare (Crim. Tr. 41). In 
connection with his counsel's motion, defendant signed on May 11, 
a waiver of his time in which to be brought to trial, almost five 
months before he pleaded (Crim. Tr. 48). More significantly, 
defense counsel stated during the plea hearing that "we 
understand [that Lewis] is going to enter a plea to a second-
degree felony in this case, not a homicide" (Crim. Tr. 277).lx 
These facts indicate that defendant was aware that Lewis had been 
offered some kind of deal in exchange for his testimony long 
11
 It would appear from Lewisfs being charged that Lewis 
may have breached the immunity agreement before he testified at 
the preliminary hearing. 
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before he pleaded. 
As discussed above, the results of the ballistics test were 
either inconclusive or inculpatory, and therefore, along with 
defendant's other purported reasons, provide no credible grounds 
for the withdrawal of the pleas. 
Moreover, there were many valid reasons for defendant to 
accept the State's plea bargain. For instance, defendant 
received substantial benefits in exchange for pleading guilty to 
robbery and no contest to manslaughter. The remaining counts 
against defendant, including one count of aggravated rurglary, a 
first degree felony, and two counts of theft, both second degree 
felonies, were dismissed (Crim. Tr. 266-68) . Additionally, 
defendant was able to plead to the lesser included offenses of 
robbery and manslaughter (R. 267). In exchange for defendant's 
pleas the prosecutor also agreed not to object to defendant's 
request that the sentences run concurrently, and the prosecutor 
made good his promise to send a letter to the Board of Pardons 
addressing the State's inability to prove defendant was the 
actual perpetrator of the homicide (Crim. Tr. 266-67, 274; see 
also letter, Crim. Tr. 200-04) . 
Finally, the State apparently had a strong case against 
defendant and could have easily tried defendant on all five of 
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the original charges. A defendant may legitimately choose to 
plead guilty, even though he maintains his innocence, because he 
would otherwise face a serious risk of conviction if he proceeded 
to trial. See Willett v. Barnes. 842 P.2d 860, 862 (Utah 1992). 
In this case, the State had Lewis as a witness implicating 
defendant in the robbery and homicide. It also had physical 
evidence linking defendant to the crime, such as the 20-gauge 
shotgun shells recovered from defendant's pockets and the 
oriental artifacts, identical to those stolen from the victim, 
found in defendant's vehicle. There was thus no "reasonable 
probability" that defendant would not have entered into the plea 
agreement even if he was aware of the three documents he claims 
to have had no prior knowledge of. 
B. Defendant has not Demonstrated that Trial Counsel's 
Performance F$ll B^IQW an Objective Standard of 
Reasonableness. 
Since defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice, this 
Court need not reach the issue of whether trial counsel's 
representation was deficient. However, if addressed, it becomes 
apparent that defendant cannot meet the first prong of the Hill 
v. Lockhart test either. 
In order to overcome "the strong presumption that counsel 
rendered adequate assistance and exercised 'reasonable 
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professional judgment,'" a defendant must prove that "specific, 
identified acts or omissions fall outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance." Frame, 723 P.2d at 405 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668, 104 S. Ct. at 2066). In 
other words, a defendant must show the challenged action could 
not be considered "sound trial strategy." Parsons, 871 P.2d at 
524. There are a "'variety of circumstances faced by defense 
counsel [and a] range of legitimate decisions regarding how best 
to represent a criminal defendant.7" State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 
182, 186 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689). And, 
u[t]he object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade 
counsel's performance." Strickland. 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. 
at 2069. Therefore, courts "will not review counsel's tactical 
decisions simply because another lawyer, e.g., appellate counsel, 
would have taken a different course." State v. Jones. 823 P.2d 
1059, 1063 (Utah 1991). 
Defendant has failed to overcome the presumption that his 
representation below was inadequate. As stated above, defendant 
has not shown that his counsel was ineffective in stipulating 
that Johnston had been subpoenaed or that there was good reason 
to have Johnston testify at the preliminary hearing. Second, 
although defense counsel was aware that prior to the preliminary 
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hearing Lewis had apparently been granted immunity, her failure 
to impeach Lewis at the preliminary hearing may have merely been 
a matter of strategic choice. Indeed, counsel might reasonably 
have thought that if Lewis's credibility was unchallenged, the 
court might not have bound defendant over on the murder charge 
since Lewis testified that it was Johnston who physically abused 
the victim and that he thought that it was Johnston who shot the 
victim (Crim. Tr. 160). Third, defense counsel could not have 
performed ineffectively concerning the results of ballistics 
tests that evidently had not yet been completed at the time of 
the preliminary hearing. 
Further, one factor that has been used in determining 
whether counsel's advice to plead guilty was part of a legitimate 
trial strategy is whether the defendant "received benefits that 
were meaningful to him in exchange for his plea." Parsons, 871 
P.2d at 524; see also State vT Gardner, 844 P.2d 293, 297-98 
(Utah 1992). As mentioned above, defendant received substantial 
benefits in exchange for his pleas to manslaughter and robbery. 
The State reduced two first degree felony counts to second degree 
felonies and dismissed three other felony charges (R. 267). The 
prosecutor also agreed not ask for consecutive sentences and even 
promised to send a letter to the Board of Pardons on defendant's 
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behalf (R. 266, 274). Defense counsel's advice to defendant to 
plead to the reduced charges was thus part of a legitimate, and 
indeed sound, trial strategy. Defendant has failed to offer 
proof of any specific acts which fell outside the wide scope of 
effective representation. 
In sum, the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion 
to withdraw his pleas. Under Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (2) (a) 
(1995), w [a] plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only 
upon good cause shown. . . . " A trial court's failure to 
strictly comply with rule 11 in accepting a plea is good cause, 
as a matter of law, for the withdrawal of that plea. Smith, 812 
P.2d at 476 (citing State v. Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92, 95 (Utah 
App. 1988) . However, as demonstrated above, the trial court 
strictly complied with rule 11, and defendant's pleas were both 
voluntary and knowing. Therefore, defendant has failed to 
establish the "good cause" necessary to warrant a withdrawal of 
his pleas and the trial court's denial of his motion should 
accordingly be affirmed. 
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POINT III 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE 
INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS, AND BECAUSE THERE 
WERE NO PREJUDICIAL DEFECTS IN THE PRELIMINARY HEARING, 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY OBTAINED JURISDICTION OVER 
DEFENDANT 
Defendant argues that because he involuntarily waived his 
rights for a 180-day disposition of detainers under the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD)12 and because the 
preliminary hearing was tainted by the prosecutor's failure to 
disclose to the trial court that Lewis was testifying under a 
grant of immunity, the district never obtained jurisdiction over 
him, all of which constitutes good cause for withdrawing his 
pleas. Appellant's Br. at 25-27. The claims are without merit. 
A. Because Defendant Did Not Raise Either of His Claims 
in His Motion to Withdraw His Pleas, this Court Should 
Decline to Consider them. 
As noted in Points I and II of this brief, this Court's 
reversal of Judge Bohling's ruling provided only for an appeal 
from the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw 
his pleas. Because defendant did not raise either of his claims 
in his motion to withdraw his pleas, the trial court did not deny 
the motion based on its assessment of those claims. Therefore, 
12
 £££ Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (1995) (attached at 
Addendum A). 
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this court should decline to consider them. 
B. Defendant Properly Waived His Rights to a Swift 
Disposition of the Charges Under the Interstate 
Agreement pp. pgtfri-nerg t 
Defendant specifically claims that he must knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily choose not to enjoy the rights 
afforded by the IAD in order to waive those rights. Appellant's 
Br. at 25. However, this assertion is directly contrary to this 
Court's holding in State v. Smith, 833 P.2d 371 (Utah App. 1992), 
which established that all that is required for a waiver of 
rights under the IAD is a voluntary plea. Id. at 372. The plea 
itself need not contain an express, knowing, and intelligent 
waiver in order to properly waive nonjurisdictional issues. 
State v. Brocksmith. 888 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah App. 1994). 
The protections afforded under the IAD are not 
jurisdictional in nature, and as such, can be waived like any 
other nonjurisdictional error. Id. at 705. A defendant waives 
his IAD rights when he voluntarily enters an unconditional plea. 
Id.; see also Smith. 833 P.2d at 372. As demonstrated above, 
defendant's pleas were made voluntarily. In addition, his pleas 
were unconditional. Defendant's affidavit for his no contest 
plea to manslaughter expressly stated: 
(5) I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I 
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were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I 
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to 
the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial 
proceedings.... 
(6) I know and understand that by entering a plea of no 
contest I am giving up my constitutional rights as set out 
in the preceding paragraphs. 
(10) I understand that although I am pleading no contest 
that plea is of the same force and effect as pleading guilty 
and that my plea of no contest will be treated the same as a 
guilty plea. 
(Crim. Tr. 80-81, attached at Addendum B). Defendant's affidavit 
for his guilty plea to robbery repeated verbatim defendant's 
understanding and knowing abandonment of his constitutional 
rights (Crim. Tr. 85, attached at Addendum B). Additionally, the 
trial judge engaged defendant in the following colloquy: 
THE COURT: Now, you understand by entering a plea of 
guilty to Count 1, Criminal Manslaughter, a second-degree 
felony; and Count 2, Robbery, a second-degree felony, that 
you will be giving up certain constitutional rights, such as 
. . . a right to appeal if convicted? Do you understand 
that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir. 
MS. PALACIOS: Your Honor, that's a no contest to the --
THE COURT: Yes. I understand it's a no contest. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: But, nevertheless, you are giving up all those 
rights; and you will actually be giving all those rights up. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir. 
(R. 268-69; attached at Addendum C). 
Defendant also expressly waived his rights under the IAD by 
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requesting a delay in order to prepare his defense.13 If the 
defendant himself is the cause of a delayed prosecution beyond 
the 120-day prosecution period established in Article IV(c) of 
the IAD, the defendant cannot assert the delay as a basis for 
dismissal of the charges against him. See State v. Jensen, 818 
P.2d 551, 552-53 (Utah 1991); State v. Stillings. 709 P.2d 348, 
349 (Utah 1985). Defendant claims he waived his rights "under 
the false premise that efforts were being made to locate his 
accuser (Monte Johnson) and that preparations were being made on 
his behalf and in his defense." (R. 14-15). However, again, 
defendant has failed to provide proof that such efforts were not 
in fact being made. Furthermore, requesting a delay in order to 
prepare his defense was certainly a legitimate reason for 
defendant to waive his right to a speedy prosecution. 
13
 Defendant was arraigned in the circuit court on April 5, 
1988 (Crim. Tr. 3), and the trial court entered defendant's pleas 
on October 28, 1988, the intervening period being 2 06 days. 
Defendant waived his rights under the IAD beginning April 21, 
1988 until the preliminary hearing (Crim. Tr. 3). At the 
preliminary hearing he again waived his rights until motions 
could be briefed and argued on July 21 (Crim. Tr. 4). On July 
22, he again waived his rights, without any limitation appearing 
on the record (Crim. Tr. 4). Even if this last express waiver 
were only until he was arraigned in the district court, to wit: 
August 8, then defendant would have waived 109 days, 23 days less 
than time in which he had to be brought to trial. 
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C. Anv Claim of Defect at the Preliminary Hearing 
Has Been Waived and is. in any Case, Without Merit, 
Defendant waived his claims that the prosecutor's failure to 
disclose at the preliminary hearing any agreements he might have 
had with Lewis in exchange for his testimony when defendant 
pleaded no contest to manslaughter and guilty to robbery. See 
Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1278 (knowing and voluntary plea constitutes 
a waiver of "all nonjurisdictional defects, including pre-plea 
constitutional violations"). Further, as noted at Point II 
above, defendant has failed to include in the record on appeal a 
transcript of the preliminary hearing, necessary to show that the 
prosecutor failed to correct Lewis's purported testimony 
concerning any agreements he might have negotiated with the 
prosecutor. See Blubaugh. 904 P.2d at 699 ("assum[ing] the 
regularity of the proceedings below when appellant fails to 
provide an adequate record on appeal"). Moreover, defendant has 
failed to supply any relevant legal authority for the proposition 
that a district court loses jurisdiction over a case if there is 
a defect in the preliminary hearing. See Amicone, 689 P.2d at 
1344 (declining to rule on arguments which defendant fails to 
support by any legal analysis or authority). Indeed, such 
authority as defendant cites rather supports the State's position 
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that any defect in a preliminary hearing is nonjurisdictional and 
is waived by the entry of a knowing and voluntary plea. See 
Coleman v. Burnett. 477 F.2d 1187, 1194 (D.C.Cir 1973)(holding 
that a defective preliminary examination before a federal 
magistrate should be corrected in the federal district court, 
rather than nullifying the bindover);14 cf. State v. Ouas, 83 7 
P.2d 565, 566 (Utah App. 1992)(holding challenge to bindover 
mooted once a defendant has been convicted beyond a reasonable 
doubt)(citing State v. Humphrey. 823 P.2d 464, 466 n.6 (Utah 
1991))- Thus, as with defendant's ineffectiveness claim, this 
Court should thus decline to address defendant's attack on the 
adequacy of his preliminary examination. 
Even considering defendant's claim, it is without merit. It 
would appear that the prosecutor offered Lewis immunity from all 
prosecution prior to February 4, 1988, in exchange for truthful 
testimony (Crim. Tr. at 33, 207-10). At the plea hearing, more 
14
 In Coleman, the federal circuit court reversed only that 
portion of the district court's judgment denying a requested 
declaration that the preliminary hearing was rendered defective 
by the magistrate's refusal to allow a subpoena commanding the 
appearance of a witness. 477 F.2d at 1212. Thus, Coleman is 
hardly even relevant to defendant's additional, though unfounded, 
claim that the preliminary hearing was defective because the 
prosecutor failed to reveal that Johnston had not been 
subpoenaed. 
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than eight months later, however, Lewis was evidently expected to 
plead guilty to a second-degree felony (Crim. Tr. 277). Thus, it 
is not at all clear from the scanty record provided that Lewis 
was testifying pursuant to the original agreement for immunity, 
but rather had broken the agreement and was testifying pursuant 
to a new arrangement, or no arrangement at all. 
Even if the prosecutor failed to disclose to the trial court 
an agreement following Lewis's denial of any promise as to the 
disposition of possible charges against him, it would not 
constitute reversible error where there is nothing to suggest 
that the circuit court, even knowing of Lewis's possible 
immunity, would not have bound over defendant. Cf. State v. 
Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989)(concluding that any 
misstatement in the prosecutor's closing statement concerning a 
key witness's immunity was not prejudicial considering the weight 
of evidence of guilt); State v. Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 656 (Utah 
1985)(noting that the mere grant of immunity does not by itself 
supply the jury with sufficient information to assess the 
witness's bias). 
Lewis implicated defendant in the robbery and homicide. 
Oriental artifacts, identical to those stolen from the victim, 
were found in defendant's vehicle, and 20-gauge shotgun shells 
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consistent with those used in the murder were found in 
defendant's pockets. Thus, there was more than sufficient 
evidence to support the bindover. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 
1226, 1229 (Utah 1995) (in determining whether there is probable 
cause, magistrate should view evidence in light most favorable to 
prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of prosecution, 
and unless evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable 
inference to prove some issue which supports prosecutor's claim, 
magistrate should bind defendant over for trial—standard of proof 
is lower than preponderance). 
In sum, defendant fails to show that there was any defect in 
the preliminary hearing sufficient to deprive the trial court of 
jurisdiction in accepting his no contest and guilty pleas. 
CONCLUSION 
Fot the reasons stated above, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this -2jf day of July, 1997. 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed first-class, postage 
prepaid, to Korey D. Rasmussen, Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145, this ^ day of July, 1997. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be repre-
sented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reason-
able time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by 
reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the 
alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant re-
fuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall 
enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for 
an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defen-
dant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury 
trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has know-
ingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, 
the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy 
public trial before as impartial jnry, the right to confront and cross-exam-
ine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the atten-
dance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are 
waived; 
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and wifiwuw sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, 
that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including 
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any 
motion to withdraw the plea; and 
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground 
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to 
make a motion under Section 77-13-6. 
(g) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has 
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser in-
cluded offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement •hall be 
approved by the court 
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court 
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to 
sentence is not binding on the court 
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea 
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon 
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agree-
ment and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. 
The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense 
counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in 
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant 
and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea. 
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defen-
dant may enter a conditional plea of guilty* guilty and mentally ill, or no 
contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a 
review of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defen-
dant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to 
the other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103. 
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996.) 
77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause 
shown and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by 
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under 
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
77*29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment 
into law — Text of agreement. 
The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby enacted into law and 
entered into by this state with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in 
the form substantially as follows; 
The contracting states solemnly agree that: 
ARTICLE I 
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers 
based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in 
securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, 
produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and 
rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose 
of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such 
charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based 
on untried indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also find 
that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanat-
ing from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of 
co-operative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide 
such co-operative procedures. 
ARTICLE II 
As used in this agreement: 
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States of 
America; a territory or possession of the United States; District of 
Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcer-
ated at the time that he initiates a request for final dispositions pursuant 
to Article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availability 
is initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof. 
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had on 
an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or Article 
IV hereof. 
ARTICLE HI 
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal 
or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the contin-
uance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state 
any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a 
detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial 
within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting 
officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written 
notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition 
to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good 
cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court 
having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable 
continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate 
of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of 
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, 
the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time 
earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the 
state parole agency relating to the prisoner. 
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in 
paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, 
commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall 
promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecut-
ing official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. 
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody 
of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any 
detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his right to make a 
request for final disposition of the indictment, information or complaint on 
which the detainer is based. 
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to 
paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all 
untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which 
detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose 
prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed. The 
warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of the 
prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and courts 
in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner's request for 
final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner. 
Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be accompanied by 
copies of the prisoner's written notice, request, and the certificate. If trial is not 
had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to 
the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such 
indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, 
and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. 
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to a 
paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with 
respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein 
by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to the receiving 
state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after completion of his 
term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request for final disposition 
shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the production of his body in 
any court where his presence may be required in order to effectuate the 
purposes of this agreement and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to 
the original place of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this 
agreement. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the imposition of a 
concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law. 
(f) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of the 
request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall void the 
request. 
ARTICLE IV 
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indict-
ment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner 
against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of 
imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance with Article 
V(a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or 
availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is 
incarcerated; provided that the court having jurisdiction of such indictment, 
information or complaint shall have duly approved, recorded and transmitted 
the request; and provided further that there shall be a period of 30 days after 
receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within 
which period the governor of the sending state may disapprove the request for 
temporaiy custody or availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion 
of the prisoner. 
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in paragraph (a) 
hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish 
the officer with a certificate stating the term of commitment under which the 
prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served 
on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility 
of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the 
prisoner. Said authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and 
appropriate courts in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the 
prisoner with similar certificates and with notices informing them of the 
request for custody or availability and of the reasons therefor. 
(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be 
commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in 
the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his 
counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant 
any necessary or reasonable continuance. 
(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be construed to deprive any 
prisoner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his delivery 
as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be opposed or 
denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state has not 
affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery. 
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contem-
plated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of 
imprisonment pursuant to Article V(e) hereof, such indictment, information or 
complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter 
an order dismissing the same with prejudice. 
ARTICLE V 
(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, the 
appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary 
custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state where such 
indictment, information or complaint is pending against such person in order 
that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the request for final 
disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall 
accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of this agreement. In 
the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in the receiving state 
shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided by this agreement or to the 
prisoner's presence in federal custody at the place for trial, whichever custodial 
arrangement may be approved by the custodian. 
(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of 
temporary custody shall present the following upon demand: 
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the 
state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given. 
(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint on 
the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of which 
the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made. 
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary 
custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, 
information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is 
not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV 
hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, infor-
mation or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the 
same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any 
force or effect. 
(d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only for the 
purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or 
more untried indictments, informations or complaints which form the basis of 
the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or charges 
arising out of the same transaction. Except for his attendance at court and 
while being transported to or from any place at which his presence may be 
required, the prisoner shall be held in a suitable jail or other facility regularly 
used for persons awaiting prosecution. 
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this 
agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state. 
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner is 
otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, time 
being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall be 
earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice of 
the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow. 
(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as 
provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to 
remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and 
any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as 
an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any other manner 
permitted by law. 
(h) Prom the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pursuant 
to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody 
of the sending state, the state in which the one or more untried indictments, 
informations or complaints are pending or in which trial is being had shall be 
responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring 
for, keeping and returning the prisoner. The provisions of this paragraph shall 
govern unless the states concerned shall have entered into a supplementary 
agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and responsibilities as 
between or among themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to 
alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments, agencies and 
officers of and in the government of a party state, or between a party state and 
its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities therefor. 
ARTICLE VI 
(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods 
provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said time 
periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to 
stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter. 
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by this 
agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill. 
ARTICLE VII 
Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting 
jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and 
regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this 
agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, information 
necessary to the effective operation of this agreement. 
ARTICLE VIII 
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state when 
such state has enacted the same into law. A state party to this agreement may 
withdraw herefrom enacting a statute repealing the same. However, the 
withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any proceedings already 
initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time such withdrawal takes 
effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect thereof. 
ARTICLE K 
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes. 
The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any phrase, clause, 
sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be contrary to the 
Constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability 
thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the 
validity of the remainder of this agreement and the applicability thereof to any 
government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If 
this agreement shall be held contrary to the Constitution* of any state party 
hereto, the agreement shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining 
states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable 
matters. 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL totfiTRICTJ 
STATE OF UTAH \^^iM t=^ £>c, 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
ROGER EUGENE PENMAN, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT 
Criminal No. CR88-1015 
I, ROGER EUGENE PENMAN, under oath, hereby acknowledge that 
I have entered a no contest to the charge of: 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE MANSLAUGHTER 
Elements: 
That the defendent as a 
party to the offense 
recklessly caused the 
death of another. 
Facts: 
On October 31, 1987 at 111 South 
Allen Street, Midvale, Utah; 
the defendant was a party to a 
robbery during the commission 
of which, the victim of that 
robbery, Spencer Neilsen, was 
killed. 
I have received a copy of the charge (Information) and 
understand the crime I am pleading no contest to is a Second Degree 
Felony and understand the punishment for this crime may be a 1 - 15 
years prison term, $10,000.00 fine, or both. I am not on drugs or 
alcohol. My plea of no contest is freely and voluntarily made. I 
am represented by Attorney(s) FRANCES M. PALACIOS and 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW, who have explained my rights to me and I 
understand them. 
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1. I know that I have a constitutional right to plead not 
guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I 
have entered a plea of no contest, or to a trial by a judge 
should I desire. 
2. I know that if I wish to have a trial, I have a right 
to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in 
my presence and before the Judge and jury with the right to 
have those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. I also 
know that I have a right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at 
state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and that I 
could testify on my own behalf, and that if I choose not to 
do so, the jury will be told that this may not be held 
against me. 
3. I know that if I were to have a trial that the 
prosecutor must prove each and every element of the crime 
charged beyond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict 
rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not 
guilty must be by a complete agreement of all jurors. 
4. I know that under the constitution that I have a right 
not to give evidence against myself and that this means 
that I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed 
any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless I 
choose to do so. 
5. I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I 
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I 
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to 
the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial 
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs 
for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by the 
State without cost to me. 
6. I know and understand that by entering a plea of no 
contest I am giving up my constitutional rights as set out 
in the preceding paragraphs. 
ocooso 
7. I also know that if I am on probation, parolef or 
awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which I have 
been convicted or to which I have plead no contest, my plea 
in the present action may result in consecutive sentences 
being imposed on me, 
8. I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of no 
contest does not mean that the Judge will not impose either 
a fine or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises 
have been made to me by anyone as to what the sentence will 
be. 
9. No promises or threats of any kind have been made to 
induce me to plead no contest. OTHER AGREEMENTS OF THIS 
PLEA NEGOTIATION INCLUDE dismissal of the remaining counts, 
no objection by the state that these counts run 
concurrently, and that a letter will be sent by the state 
to the Board of Pardons addressing the State's inability to 
prove Mr. Penman as the actual perpetrator of the 
homicide. No other charge(s) will be filed against me for 
other crimes I may have committed which are now known to 
the prosecuting attorney, I am also aware that any charge 
or sentencing concessions or recommendations or probation 
or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the 
charges for sentencing made or sought by either defense 
counsel or counsel for the State, is not binding on the 
judge and may not be approved by the Judge. 
10. I understand that although I am pleading no contest 
that plea is of the same force and effect as pleading 
guilty and that my plea of no contest will be treated the 
same as a guilty plea. 
11. I have read this Affidavit, or I have had it read to me 
by my attorney and I know and understand its contents. I 
am 26 years of age, have attended school through 
the M-£B + /tfL /Ift&ctfZ-' and I can read and understand 
the English language. U 
DATED this **oXJt\ day of October, 1988. 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me in Court this g? fc day 
of October, 1988. 
ATTEST 
H.DIXOWHINDLEY 
IDGE flTOHN A . ROKICH * JUD  
©•putyOkvk 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY: 
We certify that we are the attorney for ROGER EUGENE 
PENMAN, the defendant named above, and we know he has read the 
Affidavit, or that we have read it to him, and we discussed it with 
him and believe he fully understands the meaning of its contents and 
is mentally and physically competent. To the best of our knowledge 
and belief, the statements, representations and declarations made by 
the defendant in the foregoing Affidavit are in all respects 
accurate and true. 
L&*f-? 
CES M LACIOS, ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
S C. BRADSHAW, ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
- 4 -
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CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in 
its case against ROGER EUGENE PENMAN/ defendant. I have reviewed 
the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations are 
true and accurate. No improper inducements/ threats, or coercions 
to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant. There is 
reasonable cause to believe the evidence would support the 
conviction of the defendant for the plea offered/ and that 
acceptance of the plea would serve th^Jmblic iflterelstJ. 
ENN K. IWASAKI, DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit 
and certification/ the Court finds the defendant's plea of no 
contest is freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that 
defendant's plea of "No Contest" to the charge/ set forth in the 
Affidavit be accepted and entered. 
Done in Court this ^ Y day of October/ 1988. 
<??£— A 
ISTRICT JUDGE JOHN A. ROKICH 
- 5 -
ATTEST 
RDIXONHWOUET 
•y u " r [K Deputy K 
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IN THE DISTRICT CODRT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
ROGER EUGENE PENMAN, 
Defendant, 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT 
Criminal No. CR88-1015 
I, ROGER EUGENE PENMAN, under oath, hereby acknowledge the 
I have entered a guilty to the charge of: 
ROBBERY 
Elements: 
That the defendent as a 
party to the offense 
unlawfully and intention-
ally took the property of 
another from his immediate 
presence against his will 
and accomplished this by 
means of force or fear. 
Facts: 
On October 31, 1987 at 111 Sout 
Allen Street, Midvale, Utah; 
the defendant took property 
from the immediate presence of 
Spencer Neilsen by means of foi 
or fear. 
I have received a copy of the charge (Information) and 
understand the crime I am pleading guilty to is a Second Degree 
Felony and understand the punishment for this crime may be a 1 - II 
years prison term, $10,000.00 fine, or both. I am not on drugs or 
alcohol. My plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made. I am 
represented by Attorney(s) FRANCES M. PALACIOS and 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW, who have explained my rights to me and I 
understand them. 
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1. I know that I have a constitutional right to plead not 
guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I 
have entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by a judge 
should I desire. 
2. I know that if I wish to have a trial, I have a right 
to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in 
my presence and before the Judge and jury with the right to 
have those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. I also 
know that I have a right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at 
state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and that I 
could testify on my own behalf, and that if I choose not to 
do so, the jury will be told that this may not be held 
against me. 
3. I know that if I were to have a trial that the 
prosecutor must prove each and every element of the crime 
charged beyond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict 
rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not 
guilty must be by a complete agreement of all jurors. 
4. I know that under the constitution that I have a right 
not to give evidence against myself and that this means 
that I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed 
any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless I 
choose to do so. 
5. I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I 
were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I 
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to 
the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial 
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs 
for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by the 
State without cost to me. 
6. I know and understand that by entering a plea of guilty 
I am giving up my constitutional rights as set out in the 
preceding paragraphs. 
0 0 0 0 S S 
7 • I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or 
awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which I have 
been convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in 
the present action may result in consecutive sentences 
being imposed on me. 
8. I know that the fact that I have entered a plea of 
guilty does not mean that the Judge will not impose either 
a fine or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises 
have been made to me by anyone as to what the sentence will 
be. 
9. No promises or threats of any kind have been made to 
induce me to plead guilty. OTHER AGREEMENTS OF THIS PLEA 
NEGOTIATION INCLUDE dismissal of the remaining counts, no 
objection by the state that these counts run concurrently, 
and that a letter will be sent by the State to the Board of 
Pardons addressing the State's inability to prove 
Mr. Penman as the actual perpetrator of the homicide. No 
other charge(s) will be filed against me for other crimes I 
may have committed which are now known to the prosecuting 
attorney, I am also aware that any charge or sentencing 
concessions or recommendations or probation or suspended 
sentences, including a reduction of the charges for 
sentencing made or sought by either defense counsel or 
counsel for the State, is not binding on the judge and may 
not be approved by the Judge. 
10. I have read this Affidavit, or I have had it read to me 
by my attorney and I know and understand its contents. I 
am 26 years of age, have attended school through 
the &?,u~t f LfaAfrtLt^z, and I can read and understand 
the English l^guage, 
osd DATED this &<5Ch day of October, 1988. 
- 3 -
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me in Court t h i s 7 rC day 
of October, 1988. 
( 0 /TsrktrJS* JUDGE JOHN A . ROKICH ' 
* * ^ ~ Deputy C^K ^ - ^ 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY: 
We certify that we are the attorney for ROGER EUGENE 
PENMAN/ the defendant named above, and we know he has read the 
Affidavit^ or that we have read it to him, and we discussed it with 
him and believe he fully understands the meaning of its contents and 
is mentally and physically competent• To the best of our knowledge 
and belief, the statements, representations and declarations made by 
the defendant in the foregoing Affidavit are in all respects 
accurate and true. 
FRANCES!M. PALACIOS/ ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
JAMES C.'SRADSHAW/ ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
- 4 -
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CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in 
its case against ROGER EUGENE PENMAN, defendant* I have reviewed 
the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations are 
true and accurate. No improper inducements, threats, or coercions 
to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant. There is 
reasonable cause to believe the evidence would support the 
conviction of the defendant for the p^ea offered, and that 
acceptance of the plea would serv^yclre public jftyfcetfest. 
'dU^s 
GLENN K. IWASA 
TK&L 
EPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit 
and certification, the Court finds the defendant's plea of guilty is 
freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that defendant's plea 
of "Guilty" to the charge, set forth in the Affidavit be accepted 
and entered. 
Done in Court this day of October, 1988. 
nDISTRICT JU DGE JOHN A. ROKICH 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINOLEY 
Ctorfc 
Deputy Ctorlt 
- 5 -
00008S 
ADDENDUM C 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; OCTOBER 28, 198 8 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: STATE OF UTAH V. ROGER EUGENE 
4 PENMAN. CR 88-1051. 
5 MAY THE RECORD INDICATE THAT THE DEFENDANT IS 
6 PRESENT, REPRESENTED BY MRS. PALACIOS AND MR. BRADSHAW, 
7 AND THE STATE IS REPRESENTED BY MR. IWASAKI. 
8 I IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT A PLEA BARGAIN 
9 ARRANGEMENT HAS BEEN ENTERED WHICH COUNSEL SUBMITTED TO 
10 THE COURT FOR IT'S APPROVAL. 
11 MS. PALACIOS: THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 
12 WE HAVE REACHED AN AGREEMENT. WE WOULD TODAY MOVE TO 
13 WITHDRAW OUR PREVIOUSLY ENTERED PLEAS TO COUNTS 1 AND 2 
14 OF THE INFORMATION; THE STATE THEN WOULD MOVE FOR THE 
15 NECESSARY AMENDMENTS TO ALLOW MR. PENMAN TO PLEAD NO 
16 CONTEST TO CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MANSLAUGHTER, A 
17 SECOND-DEGREE FELONY; AND GUILTY TO ROBBERY, A 
18 SECOND-DEGREE FELONY. 
19 FURTHER ASPECTS OF THE PLEA NEGOTIATION 
20 INCLUDE A DISMISSAL OF THE REMAINING COUNTS. FURTHER, 
21 THE STATE WOULD NOT OBJECT TO OUR REQUEST THAT THESE 
22 MATTERS RUN CONCURRENTLY, AND A LETTER WILL BE SENT BY 
23 THE STATE TO THE BOARD OF PARDONS ADDRESSING THE 
24 STATE'S INABILITY TO PROVE MR. PENMAN WAS THE ACTUAL 
25 PERPETRATOR OF THE HOMICIDE. 
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1 MR. IWASAKI: THAT IS CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 
2 AND I WOULD SO MOVE TO ALLOW MR. PENMAN TO 
3 PLEAD TO THE LESSER-INCLUDED CHARGES OF MANSLAUGHTER, A 
4 LESSER-INCLUDED OF COUNT 1; AND SIMPLE ROBBERY, A 
5 LESSER-INCLUDED OF COUNT 2. I WOULD ALSO NOW MOVE TO 
6 DISMISS THE REMAINING COUNTS UPON ACCEPTANCE OF THE 
7 PLEA. 
8 MS. PALACIOS: I BELIEVE THE COURT STILL HAS 
9 THE ORIGINAL ONE? 
10 THE COURT: YES. I HAVE THE AFFIDAVIT RIGHT 
11 HERE. 
12 LET ME JUST GET THE INFORMATION. I CAN GET 
13 THAT— 
14 OKAY. NOW, LET'S GO BACK THROUGH THIS AGAIN 
15 SO I CAN AMEND THIS ACCORDINGLY. COUNT 1, YOU'RE GOING 
16 AMEND THAT TO? 
17 MR. IWASAKI: TO CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, 
18 MANSLAUGHTER, A SECOND-DEGREE FELONY. 
19 THE COURT: JUST A MINUTE. MANSLAUGHTER 
20 FROM A SECOND DEGREE? 
21 I MR. IWASAKI: THAT IS CORRECT. 
22 COUNT 2 WILL BE AMENDED TO READ ROBBERY, 
23 STRIKING "AGGRAVATED," A SECOND-DEGREE FELONY. 
24 THE COURT: AND THEN COUNTS 3, 4, AND 5 WILL 
25 BE DISMISSED UPON THE ENTRY OF A PLEA OF GUILTY TO 
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1 COUNT 2 AND A NO-CONTEST TO COUNT 1; IS THAT CORRECT? 
2 1 MR. IWASAKI: THAT'S CORRECT. 
3 MS. PALACIOS: THAT IS CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 
4 THE COURT: THE COURT HAS SO AMENDED, BASED 
5 ON REPRESENTATION AND STIPULATION OF COUNSEL. 
6 THE INFORMATION HAS BEEN AMENDED TO REPRESENT 
7 COUNT 1, CRIMINAL MANSLAUGHTER, SECOND-DEGREE FELONY; 
8 COUNT 2, A SECOND-DEGREE FELONY, JUST PLAIN ROBBERY. 
9 AND UPON THE ENTRY OF THE PLEAS, COUNTS 3, 4, AND 5 
10 WILL BE DISMISSED. 
11 OKAY. NOW, MR. PENMAN, I PRESUME THAT YOU 
12 READ, WRITE, AND UNDERSTAND THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE? 
13 THE DEFENDANT: YES, SIR, I DO. 
14 THE COURT: AND ARE YOU PRESENTLY UNDER THE 
15 INFLUENCE OF ANY DRUGS OR ALCOHOL? 
16 THE DEFENDANT: NO, SIR. 
17 THE COURT: SUFFERING FROM ANY MENTAL 
18 ILLNESS? 
19 THE DEFENDANT: NO, SIR. 
20 THE COURT: NOW, YOU UNDERSTAND BY ENTERING 
21 I A PLEA OF GUILTY TO COUNT 1, CRIMINAL MANSLAUGHTER, A 
22 SECOND-DEGREE FELONY; AND COUNT 2, ROBBERY, A 
23 SECOND-DEGREE FELONY, THAT YOU WILL BE GIVING UP 
24 CERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SUCH AS A SPEEDY TRIAL, 
25 RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES, YOUR RIGHT TO BE TRIED BY 
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A JURY 
DOUBT, 
, RIGHT TO BE PROVEN GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE 
AND A RIGHT TO APPEAL IF CONVICTED? 
DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? 
THE 
MS. 
NO-CONTEST TO 
THE 
NO-CONTEST. 
GIVING 
GIVING 
THE 
THE 
UP ALL 
DEFENDANT: YES, SIR. 
PALACIOS: YOUR HONOR, THAT'S A 
THE — 
COURT: YES. I UNDERSTAND IT'S 
DEFENDANT: YES. 
COURT: BUT, 
THOSE RIGHTS; 
ALL THOSE RIGHTS UP. 
THE 
THE 
DEFENDANT: 
COURT: NOW, 
FOR A SECOND-DEGREE FELONY 
, NEVERTHELESS, YOU 
A 
1 
ARE 
: AND YOU WILL ACTUALLY BE 
•
YES, SIR. 
YOU UNDERSTAND THE PENALTY 1 
IS ONE TO FIFTEEN YEARS AT 
UTAH STATE PRISON, AND A $10,000 FINE PLUS A : 
SURCHARGE, AND THAT THE SENTENCES CAN RUN 
CONSECUTIVELY. 
ADVISE 
» 
DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? 
THE 
THE 
DEFENDANT: 
COURT: ARE 
OF YOUR COUNSEL, MR. 
MRS. PALACIOS? 
THE 
THE 
DEFENDANT: 
COURT: NOW, 
YES, SIR. 
YOU SATISFIED WITH 
BRADSBAW AND 
YES. 
I WANT TO MAKE IT 
25 PERCENT 
1 
i 
THE 1 
CLEARLY 
000269 4 
1 UNDERSTOOD TO YOU: DESPITE THE FACT THAT YOU HAVE 
2 ENTERED INTO SUCH PLEA ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE STATE, IT 
3 DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT THE COURT IS GOING TO 
4 FOLLOW THOSE RECOMMENDATIONS. 
5 DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? 
6 THE DEFENDANT: YES, SIR. 
7 THE COURT: NOW, I HAVE MADE NO PROMISES TO 
8 ANYONE AS TO WHAT I'M GOING TO DO WITH REGARDS TO WHAT 
9 I'LL DO IN SENTENCING, WHETHER I'LL MAKE THEM 
10 CONSECUTIVELY, OR CONCURRENTLY. THAT WILL BE MY 
11 DISCRETION, REGARDLESS OF WHAT THIS AFFIDAVIT HERE 
12 STATES. 
13 DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? 
14 THE DEFENDANT: YES, I UNDERSTAND. 
15 THE COURT: SO KNOWING THAT, KNOWING THAT, 
16 DO YOU STILL WANT TO PROCEED? 
17 THE DEFENDANT: YES, SIR. 
18 THE COURT: OKAY. NOW, COUNSEL, WITH REGARD 
19 TO THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MANSLAUGHTER, 
20 THAT THE DEFENDANT, AS A PARTY TO THE OFFENSE, 
21 RECKLESSLY CAUSED THE DEATH OF ANOTHER; DOES THAT 
22 CONSTITUTE THE ELEMENTS? 
23 MR. IWASAKI: IT DOES, YOUR HONOR. 
24 I THE COURT: AND THE FACTS WERE THAT ON 
25 OCTOBER 31ST, 1987, AT 111 SOUTH ALLEN STREET, MIDVALE, 
000270 
1 UTAH, THE DEFENDANT WAS A PARTY TO A ROBBERY, DURING 
2 THE COMMISSION OF WHICH THE VICTIM OF THAT ROBBERY, 
3 SPENCER NIELSEN, WAS KILLED. 
4 DOES THAT CONSTITUTE THE FACTS? 
5 MR. IWASAKI: AS SUCCINCTLY AS COUNSEL HAS 
6 DONE IT, YES. 
7 THE COURT: NOW, AS TO THIS ALLEGATION TO 
8 WHICH YOU ARE— YOUR PLEA IS A NO-CONTEST, IS THAT 
9 CORRECT? 
10 THE DEFENDANT: YES, SIR. 
11 THE COURT: OKAY. SO THEN, AS SET OUT IN 
12 THIS AFFIDAVIT, ARE THE FACTS TRUE AND CORRECT TO THE 
13 BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE? 
14 THE DEFENDANT: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
15 THE COURT: NOW, WHAT IS YOUR PLEA, THEN, TO 
16 COUNT 1, CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MANSLAUGHTER? 
17 THE DEFENDANT: NO CONTEST, YOUR HONOR. 
18 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THEN WITH REGARD TO 
19 COUNT 2, ROBBERY, THE ELEMENTS ARE THAT THE DEFENDANT, 
2 0 AS A PARTY TO THE OFFENSE, UNLAWFULLY AND INTENTIONALLY 
21 TOOK THE PROPERTY OF ANOTHER FROM HIS IMMEDIATE 
22 PRESENCE AGAINST HIS WILL, AND ACCOMPLISHED THIS BY 
2 3 MEANS OF FORCE OR FEAR. 
24 DOES THAT CONSTITUTE THE ELEMENTS? 
25 I MR. IWASAKI: IT DOES, YOUR HONOR. 
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THE COURT: AND THE FACTS ARE THAT ON 
OCTOBER 31ST, 1987, AT 111 SOUTH ALLEN STREET, MIDVALE, 
UTAH, DEFENDANT TOOK PROPERTY FROM THE IMMEDIATE 
PRESENCE OF SPENCER NIELSEN BY MEANS OF FORCE OR FEAR? 
ARE THOSE THE FACTS, MR. PENMAN? 
THE DEFENDANT: YES, SIR. 
THE COURT: AND YOU UNDERSTAND THE ELEMENTS 
OF BOTH OF THOSE CHARGES. 
NOW, WHAT IS YOUR PLEA, THEN, TO ROBBERY, 
COUNT 2, ROBBERY, SECOND DEGREE? 
THE DEFENDANT: THAT WOULD BE GUILTY, YOUR 
HONOR. 
THE COURT: GUILTY. NOW, ARE YOU ENTERING A 
PLEA BECAUSE YOU DID, IN FACT, COMMIT THE ROBBERY? 
THE DEFENDANT: YES. I WAS A PARTY TO THE 
OFFENSE OF ROBBERY; YES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: NOW, WOULD YOU SIGN THESE 
AFFIDAVITS IN OPEN COURT. 
MAY THE RECORD INDICATE THAT THE DEFENDANT 
HAS EXECUTED THE AFFIDAVITS IN OPEN COURT. 
THE COURT FURTHER FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT, 
UNDERSTANDING THE ELEMENTS, AND UNDERSTANDING THE 
CONTENTS OF THE AFFIDAVITS, AND IN RESPONSE TO THE 
COURT'S QUESTIONING, HAS ENTERED A PLEA HERE KNOWINGLY 
AND VOLUNTARILY OF NO CONTEST TO COUNT If AND AS TO 
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COUNT 2, HE ENTERED A PLEA OF GUILTY. 
NOW, MR. PENMAN, I MUST SENTENCE YOU IN NOT 
LESS THAN TWO NOR MORE THAN 30 DAYS. GENERALLY I 
REQUIRE A PRESENTENCING REPORT. AND IN THIS PARTICULAR 
CASE, MR. PENMAN, IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING THAT YOU WANT 
TO BE SENTENCED RIGHT HERE TODAY. 
DO YOU WAIVE THE TIME FOR SENTENCING? 
THE DEFENDANT: YES, YOUR HONOR. I WOULD 
LIKE TO MAKE A STATEMENT TO THE COURT AND THEN I WOULD 
ALSO LIKE TO WAIVE THE TIME. 
THE COURT: FINE. GO AHEAD AND MAKE YOUR 
STATEMENT. 
MR. IWASAKI: BEFORE MR. PENMAN MAKES HIS 
STATEMENT, I'M SORRY TO INTERRUPT, BUT DID YOUR HONOR 
ASK FOR A PLEA ON THE MANSLAUGHTER? 
THE COURT: YES. OH, WAIT A MINUTE. 
MS. PALACIOS: HE DID SAY NO CONTEST. 
MR. IWASAKI: HE SAID HE WAS GOING TO ENTER A 
PLEA OF NO CONTEST. 
THE COURT: LET ME GET THAT FOR THE RECORD. 
AS TO COUNT 1, CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, 
MANSLAUGHTER, WHAT IS YOUR PLEA? 
THE DEFENDANT: YES, I ENTER A NO-CONTEST 
PLEA. 
THE COURT: NO-CONTEST PLEA, JUST FOR THE 
000273
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1 RECORD, TO MAKE SURE WE HAVE EVERYTHING STRAIGHT. 
2 MR. IWASAKI: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
3 THE COURT: SO, WE HAVE A PLEA OF GUILTY TO 
4 COUNT 2 AND NO CONTEST TO COUNT 1; CORRECT? 
5 THE DEFENDANT: YES. 
6 THE COURT: AND THE AFFIDAVIT REFLECTS THAT, 
7 WHICH YOU HAVE EXECUTED; CORRECT? 
8 THE DEFENDANT: YES, SIR. 
9 THE COURT: GO AHEAD AND MAKE YOUR 
10 STATEMENT. 
11 MS. PALACIOS: YOUR HONOR, WE WOULD WAIVE THE 
12 MINIMUM TIME FOR SENTENCING AND OFFER SOME INFORMATION 
13 FOR THE COURT WITH RESPECT TO SENTENCING, TO SEE IF THE 
14 COURT COULD DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT ON THE ISSUE— THE 
15 ONLY OBVIOUS ISSUE HERE IS WHETHER OR NOT IT WILL RUN 
16 CONCURRENTLY OR CONSECUTIVELY. MR. IWASAKI HAS A 
17 LETTER THAT HE IS SENDING TO THE BOARD OF PARDONS THAT 
18 WE REVIEWED AS PART OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT, AND WE 
19 PERHAPS WOULD HAVE THE COURT READ THAT LETTER FIRST 
2 0 BEFORE I MAKE ANY STATEMENT. 
21 I MR. IWASAKI: MAY I APPROACH THE BENCH? 
2 2 THE COURT: YES, YOU MAY. 
23 I MR. IWASAKI: THE RECORD SHOULD INDICATE THAT 
24 I IS A ROUGH DRAFT, BUT IT HAS BEEN AGREED UPON BY ALL 
25 PARTIES THAT IT WILL BE IN THAT FORM, AND IT WILL 
0002?4 
ADDENDUM D 
.7- U.(R«>'. 4-26-78) REPORT 
of the 
-•'•ar XJtBOAATOKT _ J t 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
WASHINGTON, D. C 2 0 5 3 5 
Sherif f of Sa l t LaJce County 
To:
 Metropolitan Hall of J u s t i c e 
437 South Second East 
S a l t Lake Ci ty , Utah 84111 
Re: 
Attention: Mr. Jerry Thompson 
Detective 
ROGER EUGENE PENMAN - SUSPECT; 
SPENCER NIELSON - VICTIM; 
HOMICIDE 
FBI FILE NO, 
LAB. NO. 
YOUR NO, 
August 12, 1988 
95-281323 
80120078 S TH VZ 
87-114571 
Examination requested by: 
Reference: 
Examination requested: 
Addressee 
Letter dated January 15, 1988 
Firearms - Metals Analysis 
Specimens: 
Ql 
02^101 
Q102 
Q103 
Q104 
Kl 
Shotshell wad recovered from victim (Q-2) 
One hundred pellets recovered from victim (Q-3) 
Shotshell recovered from suspect98 pocket (Q-4) 
Shotshell recovered from suspect's pocket (Q-5) 
Shotshell recovered from vehicle (Q-6) 
20-gauge Stevens "sawed off" shotgun, Model 94H, 
no serial number (Q-l) 
Page 1 (over) 
This axamination has been made with the understanding that the evidence ia connected with an official 
investigation of a criminal matter and that the Laboratory report will be uaed for official purposes only, related 
to the investigation or a subsequent criminal prosecution. Authorization cannot ba granted for the uaa of the 
Laboratory report in connection with a civil proceeding. 
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Result of examination: 
Specimen Ql is a plastic shotshell wad from a 
20-gauge shotshell. It is consistent in appearance with 
the type of wad commercially loaded by Piocchi into shotshells 
like specimens Q102 through Q104. Microscopic marks are 
present on the side of specimen Ql. However, these marks 
could not be associated with marks left on wads test fired 
from the barrel of Kl. Therefore, no conclusion could be 
reached as to whether specimen Ql was fired from Kl. 
Specimens Q2 through Q101 are nickel-plated lead 
pellets. Based upon their average weight and diameter, they 
were determined to be most consistent with No. 6 shot. 
Specimens Q102 through Q104 are 20-gauge shotshells 
which were manufactured by Fiocchi. Markings present on the 
side of each of these shotshells indicate that they were 
commercially loaded with nickel-plated No. 6 shot. The 
headstamps on the Q102 through Q104 shotshells were identified 
as having been produced by the same tool (bunter) in the 
same state of wear. No conclusion could be reached as to 
whether one or more of the Q102 through Q104 shotshells had 
ever been loaded into the Kl shotgun. 
The Kl shotgun was tested and it fired in the 
condition in which it was received. It should be noted that 
the barrel release lever was bent during test firing. 
A representative sample of the Q2 through Q101 
pellets, namely Q2 through Q26, and a representative sample 
of the pellets from the Q102, Q103, and Q104 shotshells were 
analyzed by instrumental means to determine their elemental 
compositions. It is noted that the analyzed pellets were 
entirely consumed in the analysis process. 
Close compositional associations were found among 
all the analyzed pellets. Results such as these are Consistent 
with all the analyzed pellets originating from the same 
shotshell or shotshells within the same box. These results 
can also be found among pellets from different boxes of 
shotshells of the same type and manufacturer, packaged on 
or about the same date. 
The portion of the specimens not necessarily 
consumed in the analysis process, as well as specimen Kl, 
are being returned to your department under separate cover by 
Federal Express. 
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